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The WTO in Buenos Aires 
The outcome and its significance for the future of the multilateral trading system 
  
Erin Hannah, James Scott and Rorden Wilkinson1 
 




The conclusion of the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Buenos Aires ministerial conference 
(10-13 December 2017) was immediately celebrated and derided in equal measure. For its 
supporters, Buenos Aires opened the way toward negotiations in e-commerce, investment 
facilitation for development, and measures designed to help micro, small and medium sized 
enterprises (MSMEs).  For its detractors, the meeting underscored the gridlock that continues to 
blight the WTO’s negotiating function and underlined the organisation’s declining credibility as a 
mechanism for governing global trade.  For civil society groups, events in the run-up to and during 
the meeting threatened to roll back the amicable rapprochement that has evolved between the 
WTO and its more vociferous critics.  In this paper we provide one of the first full length critical 
evaluations of the Buenos Aires conference and its outcome.  In so doing, we offer answers to 
three questions.  What accounts for such dramatically different assessments of the meeting’s 
outcome?  How should the outcome be interpreted?  And what is its significance for the future of 
the WTO and the multilateral trading system?  We argue that the meeting’s outcome was indeed 
significant.  It has consolidated the process of reconfiguring the WTO’s negotiating function; and 
it enables members to tackle more effectively a range of pressing economic and social issues as well 
as to navigate blockers and blockages in the negotiations.  However, it also poses challenges for 
WTO members, particularly among its poorest constituents. 
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The WTO in Buenos Aires 





In December 2017, World Trade Organization (WTO) members met in Buenos Aires for the 
organisation’s eleventh ministerial conference (MC11) uncertain about what the meeting’s 
conclusion might bring.2  They had good reason.  In the preceding months, the global trade 
landscape had been thrown into flux by the Trump administration’s hawkish stance on trade, its 
withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and its “request” to renegotiate both the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the US-South Korea bilateral free trade 
agreement (KORUS).3  The “jewel” in the multilateral system’s crown—the dispute settlement 
mechanism4—was under pressure from the United States’ continued blocking of replacement 
appointments to the appellate body.5   And tensions between Canada and the United States were 
looming in a dispute over the latter’s use of anti-dumping and countervailing duties as well as in 
aircraft, lumber, and paper.6   
 
Challenges to the established trade order were not limited to North America alone, however.  
Significant alterations to the European trade landscape were also in the offing.  Theresa May’s 
                                               
2 Peter Ungphakorn, “Buenos Aires Ministerial preview: Will the WTO have to tango without the US?”, Agra Europe, 
4 December 2017.  Available at: https://iegpolicy.agribusinessintelligence.informa.com/PL213595/Buenos-Aires-
Ministerial-preview-Will-the-WTO-have-to-tango-without-the-US  
3 Rachel Premack, “What is KORUS, And Why Is Trump So Mad About It?”, Forbes, 2 November 2017, available at: 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/rachelpremack/2017/11/02/what-is-korus-and-why-is-trump-so-mad-about-
it/#1d3373fd4375; and Shawn Donnan, “Fears for global trade as Trump fires first shots to kneecap WTO”, Financial 
Times, 10 November 2017, available at: https://www.ft.com/content/5afbd914-a2b2-11e7-8d56-98a09be71849 Also, 
Caroline Freund, “The United States wins from trade agreements”, Peterson Institute for International Economics: Trade 
and Investment Policy Watch, 18 December 2017, available at: https://piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-policy-
watch/united-states-wins-trade-agreements; and Dan Ciuriak, Lucy Ciuriak, Ali Dadkhah and Jingliang Xiao, “The 




4 Gregory Shaffer and L. Alan Winters, “FTA Law in WTO Dispute Settlement: Peru–Additional Duty and the 
Fragmentation of Trade Law”, World Trade Review, 16: 2 (2017), p. 305. 
5 Gregory Shaffer, Manfred Elsig and Mark Pollack, “Trump is fighting an open war on trade.  His stealth war on trade 
may be even more important”, The Washington Post, 27 September 2017.  Available at: 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/09/27/trump-is-fighting-an-open-war-on-trade-his-
stealth-war-on-trade-may-be-even-more-important/?utm_term=.a4241a3aca37 Also, Bridges, “Disputes Roundup: 
Compliance Panels Rule in US-Mexico Tuna Case, AB Vacancies Persist”, Bridges, 21: 36, 2 November 2017.  
Available at: https://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/disputes-roundup-compliance-panels-rule-in-us-mexico-
tuna-case-ab  
6 With a formal complaint filed after the conclusion of MC11.  See “Canada files WTO complaint over US trade 
remedy measures”, WTO News, 10 January 2018.  Available at: 
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news18_e/ds535rfc_10jan18_e.htm Also, “Canada files WTO challenge on 
broad swath of US trade remedy practices”, Bridges, 21: 36, 2 November 2017.  Available at: 
https://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/disputes-roundup-compliance-panels-rule-in-us-mexico-tuna-case-ab 
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government had begun the process of withdrawing the UK from the EU, its single market, and its 
customs union.  The EU was undergoing a process of reflection, aware that relations among its 
members as well as with established trading partners would change following the UK’s departure.  
Debate about the shape of future trade relationships, including with the United States and 
developing countries, was in full flow with both the UK and EU seeking to make swift progress on 
new trade deals in North America, Asia, and the Pacific.7  More broadly, relations between China 
and the US and EU continued to be strained in—among other areas—steel, aluminium, and 
intellectual property.  And debate continued over whether China should be granted market 
economy status amid long standing accusations that it remained engaged in currency manipulation 
and illegal state support to domestic industries.8  
 
These tensions had an inevitable effect on the pre-conference process—though they do not, in 
themselves, explain the failure to reach a consensus on either a ministerial declaration or a 
programme of work in the run-up to MC11.  Despite intense discussions in Geneva and an 
October 2017 pre-conference mini-ministerial meeting in Marrakech, members proved unable to 
bridge divides.9 Matters were not made any easier when, in the immediate run-up to the ministerial 
conference, the Argentine government decided to revoke the accreditation of 63 non-
governmental organisation (NGO) delegates, frustrating the WTO secretariat and civil society 
groups in equal measure.   
 
It was no surprise, then, that members arrived in Buenos Aires aware that little had been achieved 
and much was still to be done.  WTO officials set about rolling back expectations for the meeting.  
Grassroots groups prepared to launch demonstrations on the side lines of the conference.  A small 
group of accredited NGOs prepared to voice their concerns in the Hilton hotel where the 
conference was held.  And the Argentine authorities put on a formidable display of security that 
disrupted much of the San Nicolás financial district for the duration of the conference.  It seemed 
that MC11 had all the hallmarks of a typical WTO ministerial conference, and one that looked 
like it might fail.   
                                               
7 See, among others, “EU to race Britain for Australia, NZ trade deals”, Reuters, 13 September 2017, available at: 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-juncker-trade/eu-to-race-britain-for-australia-nz-trade-deals-idUSKCN1BO11M; 
Christopher Hope, “Canada’s trade deal with the EU will form the basis for Britain’s Brexit deal”, The Telegraph, 17 
September 2017, available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/09/17/canadas-trade-deal-eu-will-form-basis-
britains-brexit-deal/; and Henry Mance, Jim Pickard and Shawn Donnan, “UK looks to join Pacific trade group after 
Brexit”, Financial Times, 2 January 2018.  Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/73943036-efa9-11e7-b220-
857e26d1aca4. Also Michael Savage and Toby Helm, “Trump row could kill off swift post-Brexit trade deal, says 
former UK envoy”, The Guardian, 13 January 2018. Available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/jan/13/trump-tension-risk-quick-us-uk-trade-
deal?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other  
8 See Chad P. Bown, “The Perils of Shifting China’s ‘Market Economy’ Dispute to the WTO”, World Politics Review, 21 
December 2016. Available at: https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/20757/the-perils-of-shifting-china-s-
market-economy-dispute-to-the-wto Also, Chad P. Bown, “17-21 Steel, Aluminum, Lumber, Solar: Trump’s Stealth 
Trade Protection”, Peterson Institute for International Economics Policy Brief, June 2017, available at: 
https://piie.com/system/files/documents/pb17-21.pdf  
9 “Ministers in Marrakech grapple with Buenos Aires deliverables, future WTO Agenda”, Bridges, 21: 3.  Available at: 
https://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/issue-archive/ministers-in-marrakech-grapple-with-buenos-aires-
deliverables 
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Yet, as has come to be the case with the recent pattern of WTO ministerials, failure proved not to 
be the meeting’s outcome—though what was produced was not entirely obvious nor its significance 
clear.  Members were unable to reach agreement on a ministerial declaration affirming the 
continued importance of the WTO to the global trading system or its role in supporting the 
development of the poorest countries—despite expectations right up until the very last moment 
that they would.10 Extensive discussions among members also failed to produce collective 
agreement on ways forward in agriculture, e-commerce, services and non-agricultural market access 
(NAMA), fisheries, and investment facilitation for development, or to make progress on a range of 
other side issues.  Indeed, the only matter of substance to emerge from the formal negotiations was 
an agreement to renew the twin moratoriums on e-commerce and Trade Related Intellectual 
Property (TRIPs) non-violation complaints—though even these looked uncertain for much of the 
meeting. 
 
That said, perhaps the biggest, most celebrated and unexpected outcome of the ministerial 
conference was the adoption of a declaration on trade and women’s economic empowerment by 
119 WTO members and observers.  While designed to launch a fact-finding initiative intended to 
bolster the role of women in trade, particularly in new areas such as e-commerce, this is the first 
time WTO members have signalled a willingness to engage with what had previously been seen as 
a human rights issue.  Although key members—notably India and the United States—remained 
outliers, with the former claiming the issue had no place in the business of an ostensible trade 
body, the strength of support and the degree to which the outcome was celebrated during the 
ministerial conference raised the possibility that it could foreshadow the beginning of an era when 
the regulation of multilateral trade connects more effectively with global economic and social 
agendas. 
 
The declaration on trade and women’s economic empowerment aside, the apparently insubstantial 
nature of the Buenos Aires outcome inevitably drew criticism.11  In her immediate post-conference 
assessment, EU Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström was among the most outspoken, 
complaining that WTO members could not “even agree to stop subsidising illegal fishing”.12  The 
Director General Roberto Azevêdo did his best to put the outcome in a positive light, claiming 
that “[w]e knew that progress here would require a leap in members’ positions”.  “Our work will go 
on after Buenos Aires.  We can’t deliver at every ministerial”.  He also cautioned that 
“multilateralism is not always about “getting what you want”, but “the best outcome that all can 
accept”.13   
 
                                               
10 This was widely expected right up until the end of the final Heads of Delegation meeting on 13 December 2017.  
Confirmed to us confidentially by a member of an industrial country delegation in a private conversation, Sheraton 
Hotel, Buenos Aires, 15 December 2017. 
11 For example, D. Ravi Kanth, “Multilateral Failure of WTO Ministerial at Buenos Aires”, Economic and Political 
Weekly, 52: 52, (30 December 2017), pp. 12-15. 
12 European Commission, “WTO meeting in Buenos Aires: A missed opportunity”, 13 December 2017.  Available at: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1772  
13 Azevêdo’s comments as reported in ICTSD, “Bridges: Daily Update 5”, 14 December 2017.  Available at: 
https://www.ictsd.org/sites/default/files/news/bridges-daily-update-5a.pdf  
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These views were, however, quite different from the post-conference reflections of United States 
Trade Representative (USTR) Robert Lighthizer14 who commented, 
 
MC11 will be remembered as the moment when the impasse at the WTO was 
broken.  Many members recognized that the WTO must pursue a fresh start in key 
areas so that like-minded WTO Members and their constituents are not held back 
by the few Members that are not ready to act.15  
 
What Lighthizer was referring to was the issuing of a series of ministerial statements of intent from 
individual groups of WTO members committing to advance work in areas that had previously 
been off the organisation’s agenda or which had long been in a holding pattern. These 
“plurilateral” commitments saw large groups of members—but not the membership as a whole—
agree to move forward in three specific areas: e-commerce; investment facilitation for development; 
and micro, small and medium sized enterprises (MSMEs).  Lighthizer was not the only one to see 
value in these developments—which Azevêdo described as an “outbreak of dynamism”—though few 
were quite as effusive. 
 
What accounts for these diametrically opposed assessments?  How should the Buenos Aires 
outcome be interpreted?  And what is the significance of MC11 for the future of the WTO and 
the multilateral trading system?  Our aim in this paper is to evaluate critically the ministerial 
conference and the outcome it produced thereby providing answers to each of these questions.  
Four sources inform our analysis: (i) our participant observation of events during the ministerial 
conference; (ii) our informal conversations with gathered country delegates, members of the press, 
NGO participants and other observers; (iii) a body of literature concerned with the passage of 
WTO ministerials; and (iv) an analysis of official member state positions as set out in the 
statements delivered during the conference.   
 
In pursuing answers to these questions, we suggest that while the meeting did not produce the 
kind of substantive deals that resulted from the two previous meetings in Bali (MC9, 2013—see 
table 1) and Nairobi (MC10, 2015)16—and failed to attract the same kind of attention as a result—
its outcomes were significant nonetheless.  We contend that the agreement of a series of 
statements of intent by large subsets of members (including many developing countries) 
consolidates the move away from the single undertaking and multilateral deals binding all 
members that had been the intention of the Doha round, the basis upon which the previous 
Uruguay round (1986-1994) was concluded, and which had been a stated ambition of multilateral 
                                               
14 For an example of diametrical views on MC11 see S. Arun, “US calls WTO meet ‘successful,’ India says no 
substantive outcome”, The Hindu, 16 December 2017.  Available at: 
http://www.thehindu.com/business/Economy/us-calls-wto-meet-successful-india-says-no-substantive-
outcome/article21821175.ece  
15 USTR, “Robert Lighthizer Statement on the Conclusion of the WTO Ministerial Conference”, 14 December 2017, 
https://ar.usembassy.gov/ustr-robert-lighthizer-statement-conclusion-wto-ministerial-conference/   
16 Rorden Wilkinson, Erin Hannah and James Scott, “The WTO in Bali: what MC9 means for the Doha 
Development Agenda and why it matters”, Third World Quarterly, 35: 6 (September 2014), pp.1032-1050; and Rorden 
Wilkinson, Erin Hannah and James Scott, “The WTO in Nairobi: the demise of the Doha Development Agenda and 
the future of the multilateral trading system”, Global Policy, 7: 2 (May 2016), pp. 247-255.  
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trade negotiations since at least the Tokyo round but which has been gradually eroded over the 
course of the last three ministerial conferences.17  That said, this move began properly in Bali and 
Nairobi, though pressures for a shift in this direction were detectable earlier.  The shift towards 
specific sectors as a focus of structured discussions—if not formal negotiations—marks a return to 
older ways of agreeing trade openings that had once been a defining characteristic of the 
multilateral trading system18 and enables particular members (largely the industrial ones) to find 
ways to move beyond the intransigence that has held up the negotiating function of the WTO in 
recent years. 
 
Understood in this way, Buenos Aires consolidates a nascent process in which the negotiating 
function of the WTO is reconfigured.  As one senior WTO staff put it to us, Buenos Aires was a 
“process conference … a transition”19 to a different way of agreeing trade deals.  It also enables the 
membership to tackle more effectively a range of pressing economic and social issues central to 
21st century trade while also opening up the opportunity to navigate blockers and blockages in the 
negotiations.  That said, it also means that the era of pursuing grand trade deals in rounds of 
negotiations is over, for the foreseeable future at least.  This is perhaps an inevitable outcome of 
the effects of growing global economic complexity and of attempts to negotiate trade deals among 
164 members that has been a long time coming, but it is also one that presents challenges, 
particularly to the WTO’s poorest members. 
 
In developing our argument, the paper unfolds as follows.  We begin by briefly exploring the 
background to the Buenos Aires meeting.  We then explore the dynamics of the meeting itself 
paying particular attention to the political dynamics, obstacles and strategies evident during MC11 
identified by those with whom we spoke as well as evident in our own observations.  In the 
penultimate section we examine the content of the discussions focusing on those areas central to 
the meeting.  In so doing, we highlight points of contention and areas of convergence, and we 
assess the overall balance of the outcome.  In the final section, we explore the significance of the 
Buenos Aires outcome for the future of the WTO. 
 
The road to Buenos Aires 
Buenos Aires was always going to be a difficult meeting.  The previous two ministerial conferences 
under Director General Roberto Azevêdo’s tenure had been seen as successes in what had 
otherwise been a dismal round of negotiations since the 2001 Doha Development Agenda (DDA) 
was launched.  The 2013 Bali ministerial conference—the first on Azevêdo’s watch—had resulted in 
the first multilateral deal in almost 20 years with the conclusion of an agreement on trade 
facilitation and measures covering agriculture, and special and differential treatment for least 
developed countries (LDCs).  This was followed by a second agreement at the 2015 Nairobi 
ministerial conference that saw members agree to a number of substantive outcomes: a package of 
measures agreed in agriculture and on LDC issues; and an expansion in the 1996 Information 
                                               
17 See Rorden Wilkinson, The WTO: Crisis and the Governance of Global Trade, (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 75-83. 
18 For a full-length explanation, see Rorden Wilkinson, “Back to the Future: ‘Retro’ trade governance and the future of 
the multilateral order”, International Affairs, 93: 5 (2017), pp. 1131-1147. 
19 Private conversation with senior WTO staffer following the MC11 closing ceremony, Hilton Hotel, Buenos Aires, 
13 December 2017. 
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Technology Agreement (ITA).  What was also common to both MC9 and MC10 was the 
refinement of the negotiating process itself, intended to make it more inclusive and transparent. 
  
  
Table 1—WTO Ministerial Conferences 
Buenos Aires (MC11) 10-13 December 2017 
Nairobi (MC10) 15-18 December 2015 
Bali (MC9) 3-6 December 2013 
Geneva (MC8) 15-17 December 2011 
Geneva (MC7) 30 November - 2 December 2009 
Hong Kong (MC6) 13-18 December 2005 
Cancún (MC5) 10-14 September 2003 
Doha (MC4) 9-13 November 2001 
Seattle (MC3) 30 November – 3 December 1999 
Geneva (MC2) 18-20 May 1998 
Singapore (MC1) 9-13 December 1996 
  
 
However, the Nairobi ministerial conference left the future of the DDA unresolved.20  While the 
ministerial declaration formally acknowledged that differing opinions existed among members on 
the future of the round, it was sufficiently ambiguous to be interpreted by some as a formal 
acceptance of the DDA’s abandonment.  For others the declaration merely recognised that an 
enduring impasse in the Doha round had been reached.  This division of opinion 
notwithstanding, what Nairobi did was formally acknowledge the desire of some members to move 
beyond the strictures of the Doha round and pursue negotiations on issues not covered by the 
DDA. 
 
This desire was not expressed without a measure of caution, however.  The rationale for launching 
the DDA on the basis of a single undertaking had been to enable developing countries to secure 
movement forward in correcting implementation anomalies and agreements in unfinished areas 
(particularly in agriculture) in the Uruguay round, in exchange for any movement forward 
elsewhere.  Yet, as is well documented, the DDA ran into trouble almost from the outset with 
                                               
20 See paragraphs 30-34 of the Nairobi Ministerial Statement.  Full text available at: 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/mc10_e/mindecision_e.htm  
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members proving unable to reach an agreement on a wide-ranging deal before the round collapsed 
in 2008.  What Nairobi did was signal members’ commitment to the pursuit of the development 
gains embodied in the DDA, but only compel them to revisit the round in the event that a desire 
to open up negotiations in new areas on a multilateral basis was forthcoming.  Thus, in the absence 
of a formal abandonment of Doha by all members, any future WTO negotiations would inevitably 
take place among only a subset of members—that is, they would be plurilateral.   
 
Where there was no disagreement was in how these opposing views framed debate in the run-up to 
Buenos Aires.  For some Nairobi was seen as “the death of Doha and the birth of a new WTO”.21  
For others it was derided—and vociferously so—as a significant mistake.  For others still, it 
continued to underscore the faltering ability of the WTO to act as a forum for agreeing trade 
openings.  What resulted was a pre-ministerial process that saw groups of members converge on 
particular issues and make declarations in support of their preferred positions.  Seeking to shore 
up support for the multilateral trade system, for instance, 44 developed and developing countries 
issued a statement of strong support for the WTO.22  Others, particularly India, pressed for a 
permanent multilateral solution to the issue of public food stockholding.  Others still pressed for 
negotiations to begin in new areas.  And least developed members made clear the need to move 
towards a conclusion on the Doha development issues.23   
 
The result was that, despite much activity, members prepared to leave for Buenos Aires firmly 
divided.  Cognisant of the gulf between member positions, Azevêdo was at pains to stress that not 
every ministerial conference could produce “big, blockbuster outcomes”.24  This setting of 
expectations was laid out in a letter to the press on the eve of the meeting in which Azevêdo wrote,  
 
The successes of recent years have provided invaluable lessons in the kinds of 
processes that work, and those that don’t. We know … that agreements involving 
the participation of all 164 WTO members must be tailored to provide flexibility to 
accommodate the interests of countries across the full range of development. 
Adequate transition periods and technical assistance are required if poor countries 
are to take part. Such an approach was one of the keys to success in the Trade 
Facilitation Agreement negotiations. WTO rules allow a lot of flexibility in terms of 
how agreements can be structured—including if only some members want to move 
forward with a particular issue.25 
 
                                               
21 Shawn Donnan, “Trade talks lead to ‘death of Doha and birth of new WTO’”, Financial Times, 20 December 2015.  
Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/97e8525e-a740-11e5-9700-2b669a5aeb83  
22 The text of the ministerial statement is available at: 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/mc11_e/mc11_ministerial_statement_mts_11_12_17.pdf  
23 Bridges Special Update, “WTO ministerial launches, as regional leaders make public call for support of multilateral 
system”, 10 December 2017.  Available at: https://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/wto-ministerial-
launches-as-regional-leaders-make-public-call-for-support  
24 DG Azevêdo’s comments as reported by Keith Rockwell, 9.30pm Press Briefing, WTO Ministerial Conference, 12 
December 2017, Hilton Hotel, Buenos Aires. 
25 “DG letter to all journalists attending MC11. Buenos Aires: Strengthening the multilateral trading system”, 9 
December 2017. 
Available at: https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/mc11_e/briefing_notes_e/dgletter_e.htm 
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Divisions among members were not the only fault lines on display, however, or the sole 
determinants of the meeting’s character.  Also important were the tensions that emerged between 
the host nation and the NGO groups in attendance.  Indeed, events in the run-up to MC11 
threatened to derail long standing work by the WTO secretariat to arrive at a rapprochement with 
some of its more vociferous critics.26   
 
The inclusion of civil society—understood by the WTO to include NGOs, labour, business, and 
academics—in parallel forums at ministerial conferences and engagement at annual WTO public 
forums are the principal means by which the WTO engages non-state actors. This was complicated 
in Buenos Aires by the Argentine government’s last-minute decision to revoke the accreditation 
credentials of representatives from 63 civil society organisations, many of whom had attended past 
ministerial conferences and work together in the global Our World is Not For Sale (OWINFS) 
network.27 Defending its actions, the Argentine Foreign Ministry claimed, “some NGOs … had 
made explicit calls for violence on social media, expressing their tendency to produce schemes of 
intimidation and chaos”.28  Yet, not since 2005 have demonstrations during WTO ministerials 
erupted into violence.  The protests that have taken place in the interim have been scant, poorly 
attended and consisting largely of banner waving and chanting in and around the conference 
centres.  Nothing in the public statements made by the organizations whose delegates’ credentials 
were revoked suggested that a different tactic would be deployed in Buenos Aires.  
 
The WTO secretariat strongly opposed the Argentine government’s move.  Indeed, it was only 
through direct intervention by officials from WTO member states offering assurances to the 
Argentine government that NGO representatives would not engage in violence or illegal acts that 
some individuals’ accreditation was reinstated. Others did not fare as well. Two NGO 
representatives—Sally Burch of Agencia Latinoamericana de Información (ALAI) and Petter 
Slaatrem Titland, leader of the Norwegian chapter of Association for the Assessment of Financial 
Transactions and for Citizen Action (Attac)—were stopped at the Argentine border and deported 
after attempting to enter the country as tourists. Although the decisions were eventually reversed 
by Argentine authorities, they nonetheless served to frustrate civil society organisations.29 
 
The meeting itself 
                                               
26 See, Erin Hannah, Amy Janzwood, James Scott and Rorden Wilkinson, “What Kind of Civil Society? The Changing 
Complexion of Public Engagement at the WTO”, Journal of World Trade, 52:1 (2018), pp. 113-142. 
27 By way of illustration, the following were among those banned from attending the MC11 by the Argentine 
government: Argentina (Instituto del Mundo del Trabajo, Fundación Grupo Efecto Positivo, and Sociedad de 
Economía Crítica), Belgium (11.11.11), Brazil (Brazilian Network for People’s Integration, REBRIP), Chile (Derechos 
Digitales), Finland (Siemenpuu), Indonesia (Institute for National and Democracy Studies), Netherlands 
(Transnational Institute), the Philippines (People Over Profit) and the UK (Global Justice Now!), as well as 
international organizations including UNI global union (based in Switzerland) and UNI Americas (based in Uruguay) 
and Friends of the Earth International. 
28 Argentina’s Foreign Ministry quoted in “Fury as Argentina WTO attendees over ‘calls for violence’”, The Guardian, 
11 December 2017, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/11/argentina-social-media-ban-
world-trade-organisation-conference  
29 See for example civil society organizations’ letters to DG Azevdeo and the Argentine government 
http://ourworldisnotforsale.net/2017/L_Disaccreditation.pdf See, also, the open letter on civil society’s rights to the 
United Nations https://justnetcoalition.org/2017/PR_cs-rights.pdf   
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Azevêdo’s deft diplomatic signature—a key factor in securing agreement in Bali and Nairobi—was 
very much in evidence in the way the negotiations were arranged.  The meeting itself was chaired 
by former Argentine foreign minister Susana Malcorra acting with three vice-chairs: Nigerian 
Minister of Industry, Trade and Investment Okechukwu Enelamah; New Zealand Minister of 
Trade David Parker; and Hong Kong Secretary for Commerce and Economic Development 
Edward Yau.  Discussions were arranged largely by substantive work streams—development, e-
commerce, agriculture, services and NAMA, and fisheries—led by what DG Roberto Azevêdo 
termed “minister facilitators”,30 although discussions and group meetings were not confined to 
these areas alone.  Azevêdo was keen to stress that these facilitators were not chairs—position 
holders who in the past been roundly criticised31—but appointees designed to help curate 
discussion in the groups.  Moreover, in response to the demands of many members for a more 
inclusive negotiating process, Azevêdo dispensed with familiar green room discussions32 in favour 
of successively organized issue-based discussions open to the entire membership.  
 
The elephant in the room 
For all of the debate that took place in each of the negotiating streams, the policy positions of just 
one country—the United States—framed the meeting.  The United States’ refusal to reaffirm the 
“centrality of the multilateral trading system” and the need to support “development”—both in the 
run-up to the meeting as well as during its final hours—was the primary reason a ministerial 
declaration to that effect was not agreed.  Such was the strength of US opposition that it proved 
impossible to adopt even a statement acknowledging a division of opinion—in a similar vein to the 
Nairobi Ministerial Declaration expressing the range of views on the Doha round—on the 
centrality of the multilateral trading system.33 
 
Pre-conference debate on the content of the proposed ministerial declaration also saw the United 
States press for the inclusion of language “prohibiting the WTO’s appellate body from violating 
the ‘sovereignty’ of members”.34  While this was expected given US resolve to block future 
appointees to the WTO appellate body, it nonetheless cast a shadow over what had previously 
been held up as the success of the multilateral trading system in the WTO-era and one of the few 
                                               
30 The minister facilitators were: Amina Mohamed, Kenyan Minister of Foreign Affairs (agriculture); Kamina Johnson-
Smith, Jamaican Minister of Foreign Affairs (fisheries); Ine Marie Eriksen Søreide, Norwegian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs (development); Eladio Loizaga Caballero Paraguayan Minister of Foreign Affairs (services and NAMA); and 
Alioune Sarr Senegalese Minister of Commerce (e-commerce). 
31 See Faizel Ismail, “The Role of the Chair in the WTO Negotiations from the Potsdam Collapse in June 2007 to July 
2008”, Journal of World Trade, 43: 6 (2009), pp. 1145–1171; Jawara, Fatoumata and Kwa, Aileen (2003), Behind the 
Scenes at the WTO: the real world of international trade negotiations, (London: Zed Books); 
and John S. Odell, “Chairing a WTO negotiation”, Journal of international economic law, 8: 2 (2005). pp. 425-448. 
32 For discussion, see Kent Jones, The Doha Blues: Institutional Crisis and Reform in the WTO, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010), pp. 85-118. 
33 Tom Miles, “U.S. block work on WTO ministerial statement ahead of meeting”, Reuters, 22 November 2017.  
Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-wto/u-s-blocks-work-on-wto-ministerial-statement-ahead-of-
meeting-idUSKBN1DM2I4  
34 Shawn Donnan and Benedict Mander, “Trump attack on WTO sparks backlash from member”, Financial Times, 10 
December 2017.  Available at:  https://www.ft.com/content/3e05f236-dd72-11e7-a8a4-0a1e63a52f9c 
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positive developments that had occurred while the organization’s negotiating function had been 
otherwise inert.35 
 
This was, of course, not the first time that the United States had taken a robust line on dispute 
settlement.  It was nonetheless read by some as a worrisome statement of intent.  As Lucy Hornby 
put it in discussing China’s non-market economy status,  
 
WTO judges are very aware that the Trump administration is just looking for one 
‘outrageous’ ruling to justify pulling out of the WTO. They [the DSB] might be 
disinclined to provide one, no matter the merits of China’s argument that it has, in 
fact, transitioned from a Soviet-style planned economy to one based on market prices 
(if not market competition).36  
 
The role of the appellate body and blockages in the negotiating function were not the sum of US 
complaints about the WTO aired in Buenos Aires.  Also at issue was the “underperformance” of 
other members in fulfilling notification commitments. This was aimed particularly at China, with 
which the US has had an ongoing scuffle over the Chinese government’s failure to provide the 
WTO with annual lists of subsidy programmes as required under Article 25.1 of the Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures and Article XVI of GATT 1994. Despite this annual 
requirement, China provided only two such notifications in its first 13 years of membership, 
neither of which included measures undertaken at the sub-national level of government. In 
response, the US started a series of “counter-notifications” to the WTO, initially listing 153 
countries that it considered China should have notified as receiving state support.37 Although 
China subsequently improved its record of notification, the US has continued to question their 
accuracy and comprehensiveness.38 Lighthizer referenced this in his statement to the meeting’s 
plenary session, saying that “it is impossible to negotiate new rules when many of the current ones 
are not being followed”.39 
 
For all the concern expressed about the US position and its potential consequences, the Buenos 
Aires outcome may be sufficient to ameliorate the situation—at least in the near-term. While 
tensions between the US and China are the most pronounced and attracted the large majority of 
column inches, for some time now the biggest impediment to securing trade deals has been the 
profound differences of opinion between the US and India. It was this division that led to the 
                                               
35 Robert Howse, “The World Trade Organization 20 years on: Global governance by judiciary”, European Journal of 
International Law, 27: 1 (2016), pp. 9-77.  Also, Petros C. Mavroidis, “The gang that couldn't shoot straight: The not so 
magnificent seven of the WTO Appellate Body”, European Journal of International Law, 27: 4 (2016), pp. 1107-1118. 
36 Lucy Hornby, “The debate on China's status as a market economy”, Financial Times, 11 December 2017.  Available 
at: https://www.ft.com/content/cf105598-de65-11e7-8f9f-de1c2175f5ce  
37 WTO (2014). “Subsidies: Request from the United States to China Pursuant to Article 25.10 of the Agreement”, 
G/SCM/Q2/CHN/51, 21 October 2014.  
38 See documents G/SCM/Q2/CHN/57 and G/SCM/Q2/CHN/69 for the latest in the series.  
39 USTR (2017). “Opening Plenary Statement of the USTR Robert Lighthizer at the WTO Ministerial Conference”, 
available from https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2017/december/opening-plenary-
statement-ustr  
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“impasse” in the DDA in 2008,40 and it has been the predominant feature of recent ministerial 
conferences.41  What US actions in Buenos Aires do show, however, is that the era of US 
exceptionalism in trade is far from over, that WTO members are unable and unwilling to reach 
agreement in its absence, and the United States continues to set the pace in global trade. 
 
The uncertain demise of Doha 
In the background of MC11 lurked uncertainty over the future of the DDA. The Nairobi outcome 
two years previously had de facto brought an end to the troubled negotiations, after strong pressure 
led by the US for the abandonment of the round.42 That said, because there was no consensus the 
Nairobi ministerial declaration reflected the divergence of views among the membership, noting 
that “many Members reaffirm the Doha Development Agenda … [while] [o]ther Members do not 
reaffirm the Doha mandates”.43 And it is this agreement to disagree that for some members 
indicates that the round remains very much alive.  
 
India, supported by South Centre, has used this interpretation to maintain the position that until 
the main DDA issues are resolved no new areas of negotiation should be opened. Indian’s view is 
that moving on from the DDA and the practice of negotiating multi-sector trade rounds will mean 
that areas of core interest to many developing countries will be forgotten. This is most obviously 
the case in agriculture, which was the main area of contention in the DDA.  Moving away from the 
single undertaking approach will, India claims, make it all but impossible to conclude a future 
agreement on agriculture.44  
 
Substantive issues 
Micro-Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (MSMEs) 
The issue of MSMEs in trade and the aim of increasing their involvement therein was placed on 
the WTO agenda in 2015 by the Philippines. Since then the issue has grown, both among the 
membership and within the work of the WTO secretariat. MSMEs were the focus the 2016 World 
Trade Report,45 and in May 2017 a new group was formed calling itself the “Informal Group of 
Friends of MSMEs”, which has proven to be the main driver seeking a future agreement on the 
issue.46 As is increasingly the case—though often not presented this way—attitudes towards the 
proposed agreement are not split along North-South lines. This group includes both developed 
                                               
40 Paul Blustein, The nine-day misadventure of the most favored nations: How the WTO’s Doha Round negotiations went awry in 
July 2008, Brookings Institute Paper, (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 2008). 
41 See Rorden Wilkinson, Erin Hannah and James Scott, “The WTO in Nairobi: The demise of the Doha 
Development Agenda and the future of the multilateral trading system”, Global Policy,7: 2 (2016), pp. 247-255; and 
Rorden Wilkinson, Erin Hannah and James Scott, “The WTO in Bali: What MC9 means for the Doha Development 
Agenda and Why it Matters”, Third World Quarterly, 35: 6 (2014), pp. 1032-1050.  
42 Rorden Wilkinson, Erin Hannah and James Scott, “The WTO in Nairobi: The demise of the Doha Development 
Agenda and the future of the multilateral trading system”, Global Policy,7: 2 (2016), pp. 247-255.  
43 WTO, “Nairobi Ministerial Declaration”, 19 December 2015, WT/MIN(15)/DEC. 
44 See James Scott, “The future of agricultural trade governance in the World Trade Organization”, International Affairs, 
93: 5 (2017), pp. 1167-1184.  
45 WTO, World Trade Report: Levelling the trading field for SMEs, (Geneva: WTO, 2016). 
46 See WTO, “Statement by H.E. Mr. Hector Casanueva, Coordinator of the Group of Friends of MSMEs at the 
WTO”, 29 November 2017, JOB/GC/162. 
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and developing countries and is geographically diverse, although at the time of MC11 no African 
member was involved.47  
 
In the run-up to MC11 the group circulated a proposed text for a ministerial decision, calling for 
the establishment of a work programme that would address issues pertaining to MSMEs, including 
access to information, the regulatory environment, access to finance, and reducing trade costs for 
MSMEs.48 The group presented this as forming part of the development-oriented agenda of the 
ministerial, though others disagreed with framing the issue in this way. The South Centre, for 
instance has sought to question the agenda, seeing it as a distraction from more important areas of 
negotiation relating to development such as agriculture, and being potentially subject to capture by 
the interests of the most powerful states and corporations.49 Some members’ positions within 
MC11 echoed these misgivings and questioned whether the issues faced by MSMEs could be 
addressed through WTO rule-making processes. India, for instance, in its opening plenary 
statement sought to refocus attention on the items left over from the DDA,50 a position supported 
by the Africa Group and others.51  
 
Despite this opposition, the new spirit of plurilateralism led 57 members to issue a joint 
declaration on the creation of an informal working group for MSMEs.52 Claiming a “broad and 
growing consensus that MSMEs require more attention”, the declaration committed signatories to 
discussing a range of issues of relevance to MSMEs, including access to information, promotion of 
a more predictable regulatory environment, reduction of trade costs, and increasing access to trade 
finance for MSMEs. These discussions were stipulated to be open to all members and undertaken 
with “the utmost degree of transparency”.  
 
Investment Facilitation for Development 
Investment Facilitation for Development (IFD) proved to be a very similar issue to that of MSMEs. 
As with MSMEs, there was a Friends of IFD group which proposed as an outcome to MC11 the 
pursuit of an agreement to facilitate global investment.53 Noting the claims by UNCTAD that the 
developing world would need an additional $2.5 trillion in investment annually to achieve the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the Friends of IFD called for an agreement specifically 
focused on investment facilitation for development.54 A Dialogue, open to all WTO members, was 
                                               
47 The members of the group are: Argentina, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican 
Republic, El Salvador, the European Union, Guatemala, Honduras, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, 
the Republic of Moldova, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, the Russian Federation, 
Singapore, Switzerland, Chinese Taipei, Uruguay and Viet Nam. 
48 WTO, “Draft Ministerial Decision on Establishing a Work Programme for Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises 
(MSMEs) in the WTO”, 30 October 2017, JOB/GC/147. 
49 South Centre, “Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs)”, Analytical Note, 2017 SC/AN/TDP/2017/4.  
50 See, among others, WTO, “Statement by H.E. Mr Suresh Prabhakar Prabhu - Union Minister for Commerce and 
Industry - India”, 13 December 2017, WT/MIN(17)/ST/9. 
51 WTO, “Statement by H.E. Mr. Robert Dufter Salama - Ambassador Permanent Representative - Malawi”, 18 
December 2017, WT/MIN(17)/ST/69.  
52 WTO, “Joint Ministerial Statement: Declaration On the Establishment of a WTO Informal Work Programme for 
MSMEs”, 13 December 2017, WT/MIN(17)/58. 
53 Consisting initially of Argentina, Brazil, China, Colombia, Hong Kong, China, Mexico, Nigeria and Pakistan.  
54 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2014: Investing in the SDGs: An Action Plan. (Geneva: UNCTAD, 2014). 
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held in April 2017, followed by a High Level Forum on Trade and IFD co-hosted by Nigeria and 
the ECOWAS Commission in November 2017.  
 
This signalled a reopening of an issue that has been on and off the WTO agenda for some time. 
The Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) agreement of the Uruguay round was limited, 
but placed investment partially within the WTO’s remit. At the Singapore Ministerial Conference 
in 1996 it was decided to establish a working group on trade and investment, with a view to 
preparing the ground for negotiating a future agreement. However, there was strong opposition 
from much of the developing world to opening such negotiations leading investment to be 
included in the Doha round only if an “explicit consensus” was forthcoming at the next (Cancún) 
ministerial conference. Amid the collapse and acrimony of the Cancún ministerial a consensus did 
not emerge, and investment was dropped from the Doha round agenda in August 2004.  
 
As with the MSMEs issue, the historical North-South split is not the primary means animating the 
IFD discussions. All of the founding members of the IFD group were developing countries, while 
the main opponents of launching negotiations were also developing countries. Critics, including 
India and the African group, opposed moving away from the Doha mandates fearing that an IFD 
agreement would restrict their policy space and ability to regulate investment entering their 
markets.55 As with MSMEs, these critics were supported by some members of civil society and 
development related IGOs.56  
 
Despite this opposition a coalition of the willing emerged during MC11 that decided to pursue the 
issue plurilaterally. On 11 December 2017 Ambassador Chiedu Osakwe of Nigeria held a press 
conference announcing that 42 members would begin “structured discussions with the aim of 
developing a multilateral framework on investment facilitation”, including on improving 
transparency, streamlining administrative procedures and facilitating FDI.57 They made note of 
some of the objections raised by critics, including in the declaration a statement that “the right of 
Members to regulate in order to meet their policy objectives shall be an integral part of the 
framework”.58 The signatories included a mix of developed and developing countries and a 
geographical spread, including five African states.59 The group agreed to meet early in 2018 to 
commence work. 
 
                                               
55 WTO, “Statement by H.E. Mr. Vincent Munyeshyaka, Minister of Trade and Industry, Rwanda” 2018. WTO, 
“Statement by H.E. Mr Suresh Prabhakar Prabhu” (2017). 
56 Our World is Not for Sale, “Final Statement on MC11, December 13, 2017”, available from 
http://ourworldisnotforsale.net/2017/OWINFS_final_stmt.pdf; South Centre (2017). “Reflections on the Discussion 
of Investment Facilitation”, Investment Policy Brief, No. 8.  
57 WTO, “Joint Ministerial Statement on Investment Facilitation for Development”, 13 December 2017, 
WT/MIN(17)/59. 
58 WTO, “Joint Ministerial Statement on Investment Facilitation for Development”, paragraph 6, 2017. 
59 The statement was signed by Argentina; Australia; Benin; Brazil; Cambodia; Canada; Chile; China; Colombia; 
Costa Rica; El Salvador; European Union; Guatemala; Guinea; Honduras; Hong Kong, China; Japan; Kazakhstan; 
Korea, Republic of; Kuwait, the State of; Kyrgyz Republic; Lao People’s Democratic Republic; Liberia; Macao, China; 
Malaysia; Mexico; Moldova, Republic of; Montenegro; Myanmar; New Zealand; Nicaragua; Nigeria; Pakistan; Panama; 
Paraguay; Qatar; Russian Federation; Singapore; Switzerland; Tajikistan; Togo; and Uruguay. 
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E-commerce 
E-commerce refers to “the production, distribution, marketing, sale or delivery of goods and 
services by electronic means” and has been on the WTO agenda since the organisation’s second 
ministerial conference (MC2) held in Geneva in 1998, where it was agreed to establish a work 
programme to examine all aspects of global e-commerce with a particular focus on the relationship 
between e-commerce and existing WTO agreements.60 It was also agreed at MC2 that members 
would continue the informal practice of refraining from imposing duties on electronic 
transmissions.61 This moratorium has been extended at each subsequent ministerial conference 
since.  
 
E-commerce generated considerable debate on the fringes of the conference. Many NGOs were 
strongly opposed to the idea of negotiations, concerned about what they see as a push by dominant 
global (primarily US) technology companies to lock in place regulations that allow them unfettered 
access to data. The main asset of these companies is increasingly in the data that they gather, which 
can be processed and exploited for profits. For these NGO critics, the risk is that these companies 
are being given strong “first mover advantages” that will prevent the emergence of any competitor 
companies.62 A letter from a loose coalition of civil society organisation’s distributed in the run up 
to MC11 criticised the push for negotiations, arguing that: 
 
Key provisions of the proposals include prohibiting requirements to hold data 
locally; to have a local presence in the country; no border taxes on digital products; 
prohibitions on regulating cross-border data transfers; and even prohibitions on 
requiring open source software in government procurement contracts. There is no 
economic rationale as to why digitally traded goods should not have to contribute 
to the national tax base, while traditionally traded goods usually do.63 
 
Meanwhile, at the ICTSD-run Trade and Sustainable Development Symposium a range of 
speakers from industry, international organizations and academia explored the potential benefits 
of e-commerce and the difficulties that developing countries currently faced.64  
 
Within the MC11 negotiations, in addition to the usual business of extending the moratorium 
discussion focused on whether to launch negotiations on a future more comprehensive agreement 
on e-commerce. This had the support of a number of members, including the industrial countries 
                                               
60 WTO, “Electronic Commerce Briefing Note”, 2017 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/mc11_e/briefing_notes_e/bfecom_e.htm  
61 WTO, “Declaration on Global Electronic Commerce”, 20 May 1998, WT/MIN(98)/DEC/2. 
62 See, for example, Deborah James, “E-commerce and the World Trade Organization”, Our World is Not for Sale, 17 
November 2017, available at http://ourworldisnotforsale.net/2017/ALAI_E-commerce.pdf; and Jane Kelsey, “E-
commerce: The development implications of future proofing global trade rules for GAFA”, paper prepared for MC11 
NGO discussion, 13 December 2017, https://bestbits.net/wp-uploads/2017/12/Kelsey-paper-for-MC11-Think-
Track.pdf   
63 Letter from Global Civil Society about the Agenda of the WTO, 9 October 2011, available at 
http://notforsale.mayfirst.org/en/signon/11th-wto-ministerial-letter-global-civil-society-about-agenda-wto  
64 See, for example, the Trade and Sustainable Development Symposium session on ‘The importance of cross-border 
data flows for international trade’, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a_qx51YYB8I  
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as well as the “Friends of e-commerce for development” group.65 There was, nonetheless, 
opposition among the membership to the idea of beginning negotiations and by the third day of 
the conference this option had been dropped from the discussion of potential multilateral 
outcomes.66 A second group wanted to maintain the status quo, continue the moratorium but not 
beginning any negotiations on a future agreement. A third group sought a halfway house between 
these two positions, suggesting the creation of a working group and strengthening the role of the 
General Council to look at cross cutting issues with other areas of WTO law, with a view to 
beginning exploratory talks about e-commerce before deciding on whether to negotiate.67  
 
The result was that members could not agree on a future direction for WTO engagement on e-
commerce, though a sufficient number of interested parties felt sufficiently strongly about the issue 
to begin a plurilateral process. On the final day of the conference a joint statement was issued by 
43 developed and developing countries, committing the group to “initiate exploratory work 
together toward future WTO negotiations on trade related aspects of electronic commerce”.68 They 
committed to doing so in a way that was open to all members to participate, without prejudice to 
their eventual position in future negotiations. 
 
Agriculture 
Agriculture is a perennial feature of WTO ministerials and is typically the most divisive and 
difficult topic on the agenda.  MC11 proved no different. Six main items were on the table for 
consideration—public stockholding, domestic support, cotton, export prohibitions, market access 
and the SSM—though most of the discussion focussed on the first of these. Public food 
stockholding refers to policies that secure food reserves, distribute subsidised food aid to the 
poorest, and guarantee minimum price supports for local farmers. This issue dominated much of 
the agenda in Bali in 2013, ultimately resulting in an open-ended waiver –consolidated in 
November 2014 in a bilateral deal between India and the United States69—to ensure that existing 
public stockholding policies that contravened subsidy limits were not challengeable under the 
DSM. The Bali package had also stipulated that a permanent solution would be found and Buenos 
Aires provided another opportunity to push for a deal.   
 
For proponents of a Public Stockholding solution, which includes member coalitions such as the 
G33, intergovernmental organizations such as South Centre and some civil society groups, the 
current situation is seen as untenable. Under the Agreement on Agriculture, developed countries 
are allowed to provide large subsidies to their farmers annually, while developing countries are 
much more tightly constrained despite the high prevalence of rural poverty in poor countries and 
the need to provide affordable food to those in need. This is an historical inequality that 
developing countries felt should be put right as a matter of priority, before the agenda could move 
                                               
65 Comprising Argentina, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Mexico, Moldova, Montenegro, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Uruguay, and the MIKTA (Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, Turkey and Australia) group. 
WTO, “Electronic Commerce Briefing Note”. 
66 Press Briefing, 12 December 2017. 
67 MC11 NGO briefing, 11 December, 2017. 
68 WTO, “Joint Statement on Electronic Commerce”, 13 December 2017, WT/MIN(17)/60. 
69 Rorden Wilkinson, “Changing power relations in the WTO: Why the India-U.S. trade agreement should make us 
worry more, rather than less, about global trade governance”, Geoforum, 61 (2015), pp. 13-16. 
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on to any new issues. India expressed this position strongly in its opening plenary speech to the 
Buenos Aires conference, arguing that “This is a matter of survival for eight hundred million 
hungry and undernourished people in the world ... In this context, we cannot envisage any 
negotiated outcome at MC11, which does not include a permanent solution”;70 and the G33 
highlighted the agreement made at Bali to find a permanent solution on public stockholding and 
the lack of progress that had been made since.71 
 
The agriculture facilitator role was undertaken by Ambassador Amina Mohamed of Kenya, who 
had chaired the Nairobi ministerial conference two years previously and won widespread praise for 
the job she did corralling members towards an agreement. After holding meetings with members 
in various configurations over the first two days of the conference, Mohamed invited members to 
submit a compromise text. The following day she announced that none had been provided and, in 
a final attempt to salvage a deal, put forward a Chair’s text for consideration.72 The text covered all 
the main elements under discussion, drawing from a range of member proposals while also 
stripping out contentious substantive content and leaving much for future negotiation. Although 
welcomed by many members as a sound basis for moving forward, the US, in a change of stance 
from that previously communicated at MC11, made it clear that it would be unable to agree to any 
outcome on public food stockholding.73 In turn, India reiterated its position that without 
movement on this issue it could not envisage an agreement in other areas at the conference. Only 
at the last minute did India soften its position and accept the moratoria on TRIPs and e-commerce 
without a deal on stockholding.  
 
Fisheries subsidies 
Fisheries subsidies was one of the areas in which there was most hope for a substantive outcome in 
Buenos Aires. The issue was first put on the WTO agenda when the DDA was launched in 2001 
and was reinforced as an area demanding expedited attention when the SDGs included the target 
to “effectively regulate harvesting, and end overfishing, illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) 
fishing and destructive fishing practices” by 2020 (SDG 14.4). The problems of the DDA ensured 
that progress was slow, but the run-up to MC11 saw hope for movement forward. These hopes, 
however, were ultimately unrealised. Initial discussions on a range of issues—overfishing, 
overcapacity and IUU subsidies—were whittled down to a focus only on the latter, but even this 
proved insufficient to bring about a breakthrough. By 12 December 2017 it was reported that five 
options on fisheries subsidies had been put forward by the facilitator of the negotiations, Minister 
Kamina Smith of Jamaica, drawing from member suggestions, but that “for some, even the strictest 
was too strict, while for others the most flexible was not flexible enough”.74 Later that day, 
continued opposition by India meant that a deal on IUU subsidies was no longer considered to be 
deliverable and members opted to kick the proverbial can down the road, agreeing only to work 
                                               
70 Address by Suresh Prabhu Minister of Commerce and Industry India, Plenary Session, 11 December, 2017. 
71 WTO, “G33 Ministerial Communiqué”, 10 December 2017, WT/MIN(17)/38. 
72 Keith Rockwell, Press Briefing, 12 December 2017. 
73 Bridges Daily Update No. 4, “WTO Members Eye Post-Buenos Aires Work As Ministerial Talks Hit Hurdles”, 13 
December 2017. 
74 Keith Rockwell, Press Briefing, 12 December 2017.  
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toward a solution by MC12.75 Civil society groups concerned with overfishing derided the WTO 
members’ failure to act, singling out India as being irresponsible and citing their opposition as 
demonstrating that “the Indian government supports the ongoing destruction of the ocean and of 
artisanal fishers”.76 Their critique was echoed by EU Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malström, who 
took to Twitter to complain that “members cannot even agree to stop subsidising illegal fishing. 
Horrendous”.77 
 
Trade and women’s economic empowerment 
The Joint Declaration on Trade and Women’s Economic Empowerment was one of the most 
significant outcomes of MC11.78 Signed by 119 WTO members and observers, the declaration 
marks the first time that a group of members has committed to bringing a human rights issue into 
the WTO fold. The gender and trade agenda gained significant momentum throughout 2017. A 
number of international organisations are rolling out gender and trade initiatives, such as 
UNCTAD, the World Bank and the International Trade Centre (ITC). Certain national 
governments such as Canada, the Netherlands and the Nordic countries are aligning their trade 
and development policies with progressive, gender-sensitive priorities. The WTO appointed a 
Gender Focal point in August 2017 and gender and trade was a dominant theme at the 2017 
WTO Public Forum, featuring on 14 of 106 panels where participants emphasized the need to 
identify and reduce the differential impacts of trade policies on women while others encouraged 
affirmative action initiatives to connect women to the global economy. The Trade Impact Group 
of the International Gender Champions made early efforts to place gender and trade on the 
multilateral trade agenda. Against this backdrop, Canada took the lead in drafting a declaration in 
the months prior to MC11, and the ITC and ministers from Iceland and Sierra Leone played a 
convening role in helping to generate buy-in among like-minded countries.79 
  
The Declaration itself is modelled on the gender chapters of the Canada-Chile and Chile-Uruguay 
free trade agreements. It explicitly acknowledges an inextricable link between inclusive trade, 
gender equality, economic growth, and poverty alleviation. It is written in the spirit of Goal 5 of 
the SDGs and the UN Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women. The Declaration is premised on the idea that 1 billion women are excluded from the 
global economy. It calls for evidence-based initiatives such as generating gender-disaggregated data 
and methodological tools for measuring the gender impact of existing and proposed trade policies. 
In the near term, it also commits signatories to participating in a series of seminars, co-ordinated 
among relevant international organizations, ad focused on gender and trade. In these respects, the 
declaration contains a series of best endeavour commitments to explore the differential impact of 
trade on women and to develop policies that can better include women in the global economy. 
While the declaration is purely aspirational and non-binding, as are the gender chapters in all 
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77 Cecilia Malström, Twitter, https://twitter.com/MalmstromEU  
78 https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/mc11_e/genderdeclarationmc11_e.pdf  
79 Private communication with a trade delegate, Hilton Hotel Lobby, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 11 December 2017. 
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existing FTAs, many are hopeful that it signifies the linking of human rights and broader social 
agendas to the regulation of multilateral trade. 
  
This was certainly the resounding sentiment among many at MC11. Indeed, there was an air of 
jubilation as signatories publicly presented the declaration at a press conference on the 
penultimate day of the ministerial conference. At this event, signatories described the declaration 
as “masterfully pulled together” and something that establishes the basis for fair and equitable 
trade.80 Reflecting the feeling of many delegates, Ann Linde, Sweden’s Minister for EU Affairs and 
Trade said, “[g]etting more women involved in trade is sound economic policy for all countries, 
regardless of their level of development. Gender inequality is something none of us can afford”.81  
  
At MC11 and its side events, it became clear that several key figures were central to convening the 
coalition in support of the declaration: Arancha Gonzalez, Executive Director, ITC; Anabel 
Gonzalez, Senior Director of Global Practice on Trade and Competitiveness World Bank Group; 
Simonetta Zarrilli Chief of Trade, Gender and Development Work Programme, UNCTAD; and 
Francois-Phillipe Champagne, Minister of Trade, Canada. All of these individuals featured 
prominently as speakers in plenaries and panels focused on gender and trade where they 
expounded the benefits of mainstreaming women in global trade. For example, in her plenary 
remarks at the ICTSD Trade and Sustainable Development Symposium, the Executive Director of 
ITC noted, “only one in five MSMEs are women-owned; only one in five offline exporting 
companies are women owned; and four in five online exporting companies are women owned”. 
Indeed, explicit links were made by many at MC11 between the importance of addressing broader, 
non-DDA issues such as MSMEs and e-commerce and women’s empowerment in the global 
economy. 
  
Like the other statements of intent agreed at MC11, the coalition endorsing the declaration on 
trade and women’s economic empowerment comprised members from both the Global North and 
South (Figure 1). Given the stark prospect that no progress would be made in multilateral trade 
negotiations, the issue of women’s empowerment became low hanging fruit for many WTO 
members and observers. Capitalising on the inclusive and progressive trade narrative and the 
growing traction of the SDGs was one way to ensure MC11 was not a complete failure for 
developed and developed countries alike. 
 
However, on this issue India and the United States were again notable outliers, albeit manifest in 
different ways.  During one press conference, Indian Minister for Industry and Commerce, Suresh 
Prabhu stated that, “gender should not be confused as a WTO issue ... not all the issues of the 
world should be discussed in one place … [and] gender is outside the mandate of the WTO”.82 The 
US, by contrast, remained silent at MC11 on whether the WTO should play a role improving 
women’s economic empowerment while electing not to sign the declaration. 
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India was not the only vocal critic of the trade and gender agenda at the ministerial conference. 
The more critical civil society organisations accused the declaration of being a “Trojan horse”83 for 
new issues such as e-commerce, MSMEs, and investment protection and referred to the initiative 
variously as a “pink herring”, a “gender clip-on”, and as “pinkwashing the WTO”.84 One NGO 
delegate from Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN) stated that “we will 
not be mainstreamed into a polluted stream”.85  Others suggested that the “proposals on gender, 
small and medium enterprises, [and] facilitating investment for development belie the 
determination to abandon [the] promises of a Doha Development Round, with negative impacts 
on billions of women”.86 These sentiments were also reflected in the rejection of the declaration by 
164 women’s groups and allied NGOs that, over two days, signed a letter rejecting the declaration 
because it “appears to be designed to mask the failures of the WTO and its role in deepening 
inequality and exploitation”.87 
  
It is certainly the case that the declaration takes for granted the supposed benefits of trade 
liberalization for economic empowerment, it neglects widespread inequities in areas such as access 
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to medicines, and it lacks real substance. The declaration is also quite vague in that it does not 
mention women who are not engaged in entrepreneurship, who are working in the informal 
economy, or in and around the household performing work that traditionally falls on women, 
such as caring responsibilities, child rearing, health care of the elderly. There is also no mention of 
the value of positive discrimination in national regulation, such as the gender sensitive domestic 
services initiative recently proposed by Canada in the context of Trade in Services Agreement 
(TiSA) negotiations. 
  
That said, while there is little of substance to the trade and gender agenda at the WTO and 
inserting meaningful gender sensitivity into the business of multilateral trade will require a massive 
change in thinking, the wholesale rejection of the declaration by members of civil society is 
unfortunate given that the emphasis is on data acquisition and the sharing of best practices for 
assessing the differential impact of trade policies on women. What is more, while the declaration 
makes explicit links to women’s inclusion in e-commerce and MSMEs, members do not need to 
smuggle new issues into the WTO by way of a gender declaration. As discussed above, members 
have already placed these items squarely on the future multilateral trade agenda by issuing 
statements of intent in the areas of e-commerce, MSMEs, and investment facilitation for 
development. Many of the same members and observers are signatories to all three statements of 
intent.  In our view, adding some gender sensitivity to the multilateral trading system and 
promising to study the differential impact of existing and proposed trade policies are small, 
progressive steps and should be celebrated as such. 
 
Civil society 
Almost all of the issues we have discussed animated sections of civil society in Buenos Aires.  
However, officially registered numbers of civil society attendees were small.  In total only 360 
representatives from 170 civil society organizations from 52 countries attended MC11.88 In large 
part, the reduced numbers of attendees was the result of the Argentine government’s de-
accreditation action—a reason relayed to us by many of the accredited representatives of civil 
society organizations that made it to Buenos Aires—though even without the host government’s 
action MC11 would have been less well attended by NGO delegates than either of the two 
previous ministerials.  
 
During the meeting, the activities of accredited NGOs were muted.  A number of NGO sessions 
were held each day in the parallel NGO centre focused on the substantive issues at stake as well as 
broader topics such as sustainable development goals, poverty alleviation, and the digital divide.89 
Small protests were organized at the convention centre focusing primarily on the issues of 
agriculture, public stockholding, and farmers rights. Larger protests took place further away from 
MC11. Some estimates put the number of participants in these external protests in the thousands 
though it is difficult to gauge the numbers with any accuracy because the protests against the WTO 
blended in with wider domestic social mobilization against pension reform and labour rights in 
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Argentina in the lead up to a purported general strike.90  As a result, the areas immediately 
surrounding the ministerial conference were heavily militarized with a large police and para-
military presence.  
 
Civil society reactions to the outcome of the ministerial conference have been largely negative, 
widely criticising WTO members’ inability to reach a multilateral agreement on even the lowest 
hanging fruit—such as subsidies for illegal fishing or a declaration on the centrality of the WTO in 
the global trading system—and condemning the shift in negotiations away from rounds towards 
plurilateral negotiations.91 Calls to resist the inclusion of new issues were abound while a coalition 
of NGOs also issued a wholesale denunciation of the declaration on trade and women’s economic 
empowerment viewing it as a “trojan horse” for placing e-commerce and investment on the 
multilateral trade agenda.92 Many NGOs also expressed their frustration with the lack of consensus 
on a permanent solution for agriculture and public stockholding.93 
 
The news from non-state actors was not all bad, however.  For the first time an official Business 
Forum was also held in parallel to the ministerial conference. For Azevêdo this event marked “a 
new chapter of business engagement with the WTO”.94 A joint initiative between the Argentine 
government and the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the Business Forum was 
organized to give voice and a formal platform to key business interests at MC11. The day-long 
event featured many government ministers, senior IGO officials, CEOs and global business leaders 
engaged in a series of plenary sessions themed around enhancing global trade opportunities for 
business.95  At its conclusion, the ICC made an unprecedented move by formally presenting a set 
of trade policy recommendations directly to Azevêdo and Malmorra.  
 
Moreover, in the days immediately following MC11, a high-level, public-private partnership 
between the WTO and the World Economic Forum—the Electronic World Trade Platform (E-
WTP)—designed to enable e-commerce was announced.96 Questions have since been raised about 
the appropriateness of the WTO working so closely with global business but there is also 
considerable excitement about the organisation working formally with an NGO—the WEF—that 
represents effective global cooperation.97  
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The future for the WTO 
In terms of its significance for the multilateral trading system, what emerged from Buenos Aires 
was a consolidation of the turn away from the pursuit of single undertakings as the product of 
complex negotiations among all members in formal rounds towards a variable geometry in which 
subsets of members pursue agreements in specific sectors.  And while there will inevitably be 
pressure for multilateral deals in the future, for the medium term at least there is no appetite 
among the vast majority of members for a return to the intransigence of the past.  Notably, this has 
been achieved at the same time that further positive refinements have been made to the 
negotiating process. 
 
Buenos Aires is of course not unique in this regard.  Rather, it takes forward a development set in 
motion at the Bali and Nairobi meetings.  Taken together, however, the three ministerial 
conferences represent the end of a critical moment in the evolution of the multilateral trading 
system that had seen members attempt to ensure that all negotiations resulted in universal deals.  
However, in the history of the institution—from its earliest days under the auspices of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)—only one universally binding deal was negotiated: the 
Uruguay round.  All others involved either only limited subsets of members as signatories (as all 
the rounds prior to the Uruguay round had been), or else they have been issue specific deals, such 
as that on trade facilitation concluded at MC9.  Had members managed to agree a deal under the 
auspices of the Doha round then this may have consolidated the institution’s movement onto a 
different pathway, wherein multilateral deals were the established norm.  However, with the setting 
aside of the Doha round in Nairobi and the tacit acceptance that development issues will be dealt 
without the need to rehabilitate a moribund negotiating framework, there appears little chance 
that genuinely multilateral outcomes will emerge anytime soon.   
 
What is also significant about Buenos Aires is the extent to which there is little appetite for 
developing countries to stand any longer in large immovable groups.  While standing together in 
solidarity may have been useful at moments in Doha negotiations, and it has been particularly 
useful to India in the pursuit of its own interests, doing so has cost many others the opportunity to 
move forward on deals in areas of genuine interest.  The decision by 69 members to embark on 
structured discussions on investment facilitation for development is instructive in this regard. 
 
What Buenos Aires also showed was further evidence that plurilateral negotiations are not only 
the “new normal”, they represent the only apparent form in which trade agreements will be 
delivered in the WTO. While there are clear and well document problems with the plurilateral 
approach as a negotiating norm in the WTO,98 in the face of a continual blocking by some 
countries of any attempts to push the agenda forward—particularly by India whose stance in 
Buenos Aires of refusing to sign on to any initiative until a permanent resolution had been 
reached on public stockholding won it few friends—plurilateralism has become the only available 
avenue for attempting to negotiate trade deals.  This was the case not only with the ITA expansion 
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agreed in Nairobi and the spark of negotiations on e-commerce in Buenos Aires but it is also 
signalled in the intentions of groups like the Friends of Investment Facilitation for Development 
or the MSMEs.99 This is also indicated by the broader move by 119 members and observers to 
bring social and human rights issues into the WTO fray with the signing of the Declaration on 
Trade and Women’s Empowerment.  For better or worse, with the conclusion of MC11 we have 
clearly entered a new era of pragmatism at the WTO where the focus is on finding points of 
convergence and taking action among many like-minded members—developed and developing 
countries alike—despite the intransigence of the few. 
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